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THE NLRB'S DEFERRAL POLICY
AND UNION REFORM:
A UNION PERSPECTIVE
Leonard Page*
Daniel W. Sherrick**

Currently, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or
Board) refuses to pursue unfair labor practice complaints under
the National Labor Relations Act 1 (NLRA) whenever the
underlying dispute can be addressed instead by a grievancearbitration process negotiated by the union and employer
parties to a collective-bargaining agreement. 2 This broad
deferral policy attempts to balance the NLRB's duty to prevent unfair labor practices 3 against the policy of the Labor
*
Associate General Counsel, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). B.A., University
of Michigan, 1965; M.B.A., University of Michigan, 1968; J.D., Detroit College of Law,
1972.
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Associate General Counsel, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). B.A., Yale
University, 1980; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1984.
The authors would like to thank Sara deLone, J.D., Yale Law School, 1991, a
summer intern at the UAW, for her assistance. George Feldman and Marsha Berzon
also provided helpful insights and comments on earlier drafts. Any errors, of course,
are ours. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of
the International Union, UAW.
1.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1988).
2.
See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 1252, 1256 (1988)
("[Tihe Board's processes are available in the first instance to individual employees
if private dispute-resolution mechanisms do not exist or, for one reason or another,
are inadequate. Where such mechanisms exist and the other conditions for deferral
are met, however, the Board will stay its hand and afford the private grievancearbitration machinery the first opportunity to decide the issue.") (emphasis in
original).
3.
Section 10(a) of the NLRA provides that the Board is "empowered ... to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise ... .
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988). The first section of the Act makes clear that prevention
of unfair labor practices protects the nation's economy as well as workers' rights:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes ....

and by

restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
Id. § 151.
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Management Relations Act 4 (LMRA) to promote the "[flinal
adjustment [of disputes] by a method agreed upon by the
parties."'
The tortuous development of case law in this area has
already generated a great deal of legal scholarship.6 Our
purpose is not to rehash the history of these developments. 7
4.
Id. §§ 141-187.
5.
Section 203(d) of the LMRA provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
The [Federal Mediation and Conciliation] Service is directed to make its
conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance
disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
Id. § 173(d). This section, although appearing under the heading "Use of conciliation
and mediation services as last resort," has come to stand for the general principle
that national labor policy broadly favors private resolution of workplace disputes.
See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 735-36 (1981).
The NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, was passed in 1935, see Pub. L. No. 74198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), and significantly amended in 1947 by the LMRA, also known
as the Taft-Hartley Act, see Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). We will adopt
the common practice, among the union-side bar at least, of referring to this law as
the NLRA, or simply the Act. Only when the LMRA added an entirely new section,
such as section 203(d), will we refer to the LMRA.
6.
Some representative articles include: Bush, The Nature of the Deferral
Problem Involving Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) Charges, 4 LAB. LAW. 103 (1988);
Collyer, NLRB Deferral to Arbitration, in LABOR ARBITRATION, A PRACTICAL GUIDE

FOR ADVOCATES 304 (1990); Edwards, Deferral to Arbitrationand Waiver of the Duty
to Bargain: A Possible Way Out of EverlastingConfusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 23 (1985); Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49
IND. L.J. 57 (1973); Isaacson & Zifchak, Agency Deferral to Private Arbitration of
Employment Disputes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1383 (1973); Johannesen & Smith, Collyer:
Open Sesame to Deferral, 23 LAB. L.J. 723 (1972); Levy, Deferral and the Dissident,
24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 479 (1991); Moses, Deferral to Arbitrationin Individual Rights
Cases: A Re-examination of Spielberg, 51 TENN. L. REV. 187 (1984); Peck, A Proposal
to End NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 WASH. L. REV. 355 (1985);
Shank, Deferralto Arbitration: Accommodation of Competing Statutory Policies, 2
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 211 (1985); Sharpe, NLRB Deferral to Grievance-Arbitration: A
GeneralTheory, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 595 (1987); Comment, The NationalLabor Relations
Board'sPolicy of Deferral to Arbitration, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1141 (1986) (authored
by James I. Briggs, Jr.); Comment, Further Convolutions in a Convoluted Policy:
Olin, Taylor, and NLRB Deferral to Arbitral Decisions, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 443 (1988)
(authored by Thomas L. Kittle-Kamp) [hereinafter Comment, FurtherConvolutions];
Comment, Arbitrationand NLRB Deferral: From Spielberg to Suburban Motor Freight
and Beyond, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 785 (1984) (authored by Julie R. Vacura).
7.
We note that the NLRB's flip-flops on deferral policy have often coincided
with changes in guiding philosophy (and political affiliation) of the members of the
Board. As one commentator noted:
Shortly after President Reagan assumed office, changes in composition of the
Board made prediction of [the Board's prearbitral deferral] course difficult. ...
...
Shifting Board membership has caused [deferral doctrine] to undergo
almost continual metamorphoses. The fluctuation is explained by the sharp
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Nor will we dwell at length on the various attempts to parse
out statutory language or tally the rather opaque legislative
history on this subject. Those exercises, while of obvious
value, have already been attempted' and, in our view, have
resulted in a stalemate. 9 Both the statute ° and its legislative history" provide broad support for two conflicting goals:
creating specifically enumerated statutory protections while at
the same time encouraging private resolution of workplace
disputes.
The conflict between these goals is readily apparent.
Private dispute-resolution mechanisms draw their legitimacy,
and therefore their viability, from their ability to impose final
and binding solutions upon the parties. To the extent that a
reviewing agency can interrupt or upset the determinations of
a private resolution process, the integrity of that private
process is diminished and its usefulness is compromised. Yet,
if the statutory rights deserve protection for their own sake,
their enforcement must remain the Board's province and
should not be abandoned to private parties applying privately
designed standards of conduct subject to only limited review.
In practice, the NLRB's deferral doctrine oscillates between
these two poles.
From a union perspective, striking the appropriate balance
between these conflicting policy goals is particularly difficult.
On one hand, the fundamental purpose of unions is to enhance
and safeguard the economic security and workplace dignity of
working people. It is entirely inimical to that purpose to
abandon statutory protections for employees whenever available. On the other hand, as the very nature of a labor union
demonstrates, the principal weapon employed by unions in
their fight for economic security and workplace dignity is
collective action which, to be most successful, must create

philosophical differences among Board members in an area where decisions are
based more upon policy than clear statutory mandate.
Shank, supra note 6, at 246, 251; see also Peck, supra note 6, at 355 ("The new
policies are redolent with the politics of a changed administration rather than
expertise in labor relations.").
8.
See generally Sharpe, supra note 6, at 613-17.
9.
Compare Edwards, supra note 6, at 24, 40 (concluding that Board deferral
policy should be broad) with Levy, supra note 6, at 518-50 (arguing that Board
deferral policy should be narrow).
10.
NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988); LMRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1988).
11.
For the complete legislative history of the NLRA, see generally NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935 (1949).
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institutional structures to maintain and enforce the workplace
standards developed through that collective action. Unions
negotiate collective-bargaining agreements for that purpose.
The integrity of those agreements is determined not only by
the substantive standards that they establish, but also largely
by the union's and employer's ability to resolve disputes
regarding interpretation and application of those agreements
through negotiation or, if necessary, through a disputeresolution mechanism which is internal to the relationship.
The alternative-reliance on external entities applying
standards of conduct determined by legislation rather than
collective bargaining-marginalizes the union and the labor
agreement and, to some degree, eliminates the role of collective action. In short, unions are both proemployee and in
favor of promoting the integrity of the arbitral process. Like
courts, unions have a difficult time balancing these conflicting
policies to determine under what circumstances Board
enforcement should be deferred to the parties' chosen mechanism for resolving workplace disputes.
It is important to recognize at the outset that any policy of
deferral or deference to arbitral awards runs the risk of
diminishing the substantive statutory protections that
Congress has fashioned for employees. At bottom, deferral
means that the Board will tolerate arbitral remedies-and
refuse to intercede-even when those arbitral remedies
provide different, and less complete, relief than the Board
would order were it reviewing the dispute de novo. Under
current Board doctrine, 2 therefore, employees covered by a
collective-bargaining agreement will enjoy less statutory
protection from employer misconduct than their nonunion
counterparts.13 Because Congress specifically intended the
NLRA to protect all employees and encourage the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining, 4 this result is particularly
anomalous.
Fortunately, we will not spend our entire discussion agonizing over these conflicting goals and describing ad hoc solutions
based on value judgments about their relative importance in
particular instances. In our view, some principled distinctions
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
12.
For example, under current doctrine the Board will not order additional relief
13.
even though the arbitral award is not "totally consistent with Board precedent." Olin
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984); see also infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text
(discussing Olin).
14.
See NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988); see also supra note 3 (quoting
section 10(a)).
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can be made, based on the type of statutory right at issue,15
the quality of arbitral resolution,1 6 and the ability of the
arbitrator to apply standards similar to those set forth in the
statute.17
We believe that the NLRB, in its original development of
deferral principles, correctly balanced the competing policies
and correctly understood the various principled distinctions
outlined above. Recently, however, the Board has abandoned
those distinctions and now defers virtually all unfair labor
practice charges whenever the negotiated grievance-arbitration
process can possibly be applied to the dispute. In our view,
the deferral doctrine has thus exceeded its proper bounds and
should be reexamined.
In Part I, after very briefly visiting the origins of NLRB
deferral doctrine, we will shamelessly skip nearly thirty years
of "twists and turns " "R of case law development and summarize the current NLRB position in this area. In Part II we
catalog some current union criticisms of the NLRB's nearly
boundless application of deferral, and identify, from both
practical and policy points of view, some of the more specific
competing considerations. In Part III, we narrow the focus
and address the implications of deferral policies for "union
reform," pausing also to consider the applicability of these
doctrines to private dispute-resolution mechanisms found in
the constitutions of most labor unions.
I. DEFERRAL: ITS ORIGINS AND CURRENT DOCTRINE
The NLRB's deferral policy actually consists of two related
doctrines: one involving unfair labor practice charges filed
prior to an arbitrator's ruling (but while a grievance is in
progress), and one involving the scope of NLRB review after

15.
See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (noting
that "[airbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contract disputes,
make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of
rights created by Title VII"); see also infra notes 21-37, 66-96 and accompanying text;
cf. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 842 (1971) (noting that a dispute
involving a claim of a NLRA § 8(a)(5) violation "is one eminently well suited to
resolution by arbitration" because the contract lies "at the center of this dispute").
16.
See, e.g., International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), enforced
sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003
(1964); see also infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
17.
International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. at 927.
18.
Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1408 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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arbitral resolution.1 9 Properly or not, the first of these
doctrines borrows heavily from principles announced under the
rubric of exhaustion of available remedies and the second has
come to resemble doctrines of appellate review.2"
In the prearbitral setting, NLRB deferral doctrine was
developed primarily in Collyer Insulated Wire. 2 In Collyer,
the charging party alleged that the employer violated the duty
to bargain when-during the labor contract's term-the
employer implemented various unilateral changes in terms
and conditions of employment.2 2 The Board announced that,

19.
We distinguish pre- and postarbitral deferrals mainly for heuristic purposes.
Much of our argument does not depend on this distinction. In certain contexts,
however, it will be particularly useful to bear this distinction in mind. See infra
notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing NLRB review of arbitral rulings in the
postarbitral context); note 99 and accompanying text (analogizing the analysis of the
NLRB's deferral doctrine to the jurisdictional doctrine of ripeness in the prearbitral
context).
The Board does not base its deferral policies on jurisdictional grounds but
20.
rather on more discretionary policy-oriented grounds. See infra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text; see also, e.g., International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 92527 (1962), enforced sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784, 787 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). The Supreme Court, in fact, has clearly held that
Board jurisdiction is not ousted merely because the dispute may also be covered in
some respect by the labor agreement or because the Board may be required to
interpret the labor contract to resolve the unfair labor practice charge. NLRB v.
C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421, 425-30 (1967).
192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). Prior to Collyer, the Board had deferred sporadi21.
cally in some cases. See, e.g., Dubo Mfg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963). In fact, for
many years Dubo continued to have life outside the more general-and constantly
shifting-doctrines of deferral. In general, under Dubo, the Board would allow an
individual to choose arbitral relief rather than pursue an unfair labor practice charge
based on improper discharge or discipline. Id. at 432. The Board, under Dubo, would
also monitor the progress of the grievance-arbitration process more aggressively than
in the more common section 8(a)(5) deferral cases. Id. at 433. See, e.g., NLRB Gen.
Couns. Mem. No. 79-36 (May 14, 1979). The subsequent cases of Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 573 (1984), and United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984),
however, seem to have rendered Dubo largely inapplicable.
Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 837-38. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA provides that
22.
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). In several
early cases, the Board held that the duty to bargain largely survives execution of a
collective-bargaining agreement. See, e.g., NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d
632, 638 (4th Cir. 1940) (enforcing the Board's order and concluding that the labor
agreement provides only a 'framework within which the process of collective
bargaining may be carried on"). The more current, contract-based position of the
Board was announced in Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1219 (1951), enforced,
196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). The Second Circuit, in Jacobs, held that the duty to
bargain during a contract attaches only to those subjects neither discussed nor
resolved in reaching the contract. Jacobs, 196 F.2d at 680. The NLRA does,
however, allow the parties to provide for midterm bargaining-with full rights to
engage in strikes-by providing for a contract "re-opener" prior to the contract's
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rather than view the charge through the prism of the statutory duty to bargain, it would await arbitral resolution to
determine whether, according to the parties' chosen method of
contract interpretation, the existing labor contract permitted
the employer's conduct.2 3 Implicit in Collyer's holding is the
principle that employer actions permitted by the labor
agreement do not violate the duty to bargain; the parties have
already bargained and the employer has already obtained the
right to take the disputed action during the course of the
contract.2 4 If, however, an arbitrator finds that the agreement does not permit the employer action, she will order
appropriate relief and the Board need not intercede. Although
the Collyer Board did not base its holding squarely on this
reasoning, it stands, we believe, as the proper justification for
the deferral of section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain charges.2 5
The Collyer Board emphasized general principles such as the
importance of private resolution of workplace disputes and the
integrity of the arbitral process.26 By basing its decision on
these grounds, rather than the more specific nature of the
statutory duty to bargain itself, we believe that the Board laid
the groundwork for the improper expansion of the deferral
doctrine to areas outside the duty to bargain. For reasons not
made clear in Collyer itself, however, the Board did demonstrate some caution when it originally developed the Collyer
doctrine. Thus, the Collyer Board noted that deferral was
appropriate there because "the contract and its meaning...
lie at the center of the dispute."27 The Board also observed
that the charging party did not claim that the employer was
hostile to the exercise of statutorily protected rights by employees, the parties had enjoyed a long and stable collectivebargaining relationship, the arbitration clause was clearly
broad enough to encompass the dispute, and the dispute was
expiration. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 292-93
(1957). The Board has had continual difficulty applying this doctrine. See infra notes
73-75 and accompanying text. In large measure, continuing application of Collyer has
allowed the Board to avoid resolving its difficulties in determining the scope of the
continuing duty to bargain during a contract's term.
23.
Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 842.
24.
"[T]he [National Labor Relations] Act and its policies become involved only
if it is determined that the agreement between the parties ... did not sanction [the
employer's] right to make the disputed changes . . . under the contractually
prescribed procedure." Id.
25.
But see infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
26.
192 N.L.R.B. at 839-40.
27.
Id. at 842.

654

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL.

24:3 & 4

"eminently well suited" to arbitral resolution.2 8 The Collyer
Board also retained jurisdiction to ensure that the arbitral or
consensual resolution of the dispute comported with the
standard for postarbitral deferral then in effect2 9 under
Spielberg Manufacturing Co.3"

Following years of inconsistent doctrine in this area, the
Board, in United Technologies Corp.,31 abandoned most, if
not all, of the limitations on prearbitral deferral expressed
in Collyer"
Most importantly, in the wake of United
Technologies Corp., the Board no longer requires that the
33
contract and its meaning be at "the center" of the dispute
and no longer limits deferral to section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain
charges.34 Instead, the Board now also defers unfair labor
practice charges alleging the violation of specific statutory
protections found in section 8(a)(3) by employers.
In short,
the Board now defers routinely whenever the "dispute"36 is
subject in any respect to the contractual grievance procedure,
even though the employee rights at issue may be the subject
of specific statutory protections.

28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 843.
30.
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text
(discussing Spielberg standard).
31.
268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
32.
See id. at 559-60. Of course, the Board will defer only if the parties remain
willing to arbitrate. Id. at 560. See also id. at 561 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
33.
268 N.L.R.B. at 560.
34.
See id. at 559.
35.
See id.; see also id. at 561 (Zimmerman, dissenting).
36.
The term "dispute" is subject to various meanings, and it is important to
understand what the term means in each context. When an individual is discharged,
for example, that discharge may violate both contractual and statutory standards of
employer conduct and will generally involve disputed facts as well. So, the "dispute"
may be the dispute over the facts, the efforts to challenge the employer conduct in
general, the effort to apply contractual standards of conduct to challenge the
discharge, or the effort to apply statutory standards of conduct to challenge the
discharge. To say that the "dispute" is subject to arbitral resolution could have any
of these meanings. The Olin Board's current requirement that an arbitrator need
only be presented with the facts relevant to the unfair labor practice issue-without
any Board consideration of what standards of conduct the arbitrator applied-represents an improper expansion of the deferral doctrine because it ensures
arbitral consideration only of the factual aspects of the "dispute." See infra notes 4246 and accompanying text.
37.
See, e.g., United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 560 (holding that an
alleged threat violative of NLRA § 8(a)(1) should be deferred because it is "clearly
cognizable under the broad grievance-arbitration provisions .. .of the collectivebargaining agreement").
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In the postaward setting, the Board has similarly expanded
the deferral doctrine. In Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,38 the
Board first announced that it would defer to arbitral decisions
if the arbitration proceedings were "fair and regular, all
parties had agreed to be bound [by the result], and the
decision of the arbitration panel [was] not clearly repugnant
to the purposes and policies of the Act."39 The Board added
a fourth requirement several years later in Raytheon Co.40
There the Board held that it would not give effect to an
arbitration agreement where the arbitrator "ignored the unfair
labor practice ... in issue before the Board."41 In addition,
until recently, the Board required the party requesting
deferral to demonstrate that these standards were satisfied.42
Present Board doctrine, as expressed in Olin Corp.," has
eviscerated each of these standards. All that remains of
Raytheon's requirement that the arbitrator consider the
specific unfair labor practice issue before the Board is the
requirement that the contract interpretation issue be "factually parallel to the unfair labor practice issue and [that] the
arbitrator was presented generally with the facts" that would
have been relevant to the unfair labor practice determination.4 4 Absent is any effort to ensure that the arbitrator
applied similar normative standards to judge the employer
conduct at issue. In addition, the "clearly repugnant" requirement is now deemed satisfied whenever the arbitral award is

38.
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
39.
Id. at 1082. Prior to Spielberg, the Board reviewed all unfair labor practice
charges de novo despite the presence of an arbitral award involving the same dispute.
See, e.g., Rieke Metal Prods. Corp., 40 N.L.R.B. 867, 874 (1942).
40.
140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
41.
Id. at 886. See also Comment, Further Convolutions, supra note 6, at 445.
This requirement in particular has led to confusion because of the difficulties
inherent in arbitral consideration of statutory standards, and arbitrators' hesitance
to rely on public law, as opposed to the agreement which they are charged with
interpreting, when measuring the propriety of employer conduct. See Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743-44 (1981) (noting that the arbitrator "may lack the competence to decide the ultimate legal issue whether an
employee's right ... under the statute has been violated," and may lack the
"contractual authority" to apply statutory law).
42.
See, e.g., Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 928 (1972) (discussing the
pre-Olin requirement that the party seeking deferral demonstrate the adequacy of
arbitral process and result). But cf. John Sexton & Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 794, 795 (1974)
(limiting the burden of the party seeking deferral to providing clear evidence of the
specific arbitral issues and result and shifting the burden of showing the unfairness
of the process and the inadequacy of the result to the party seeking to avoid deferral).
43.
268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
44.
Id. at 574.
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not "'palpably wrong' i.e.,.. . not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act."45 Finally, Olin places the
burden of proof squarely on the party seeking Board relief;
that party must "affirmatively demonstrat[e] the defects in the
arbitral process or award" 46 before the NLRB will even
consider whether an unfair labor practice has been committed.
Fortunately, and in rather stark contrast with its otherwise
extremely broad deferral policy, the NLRB still does not defer
to a grievance procedure to resolve disputes concerning a
union's right to information. The Board has held that "before
a union is put to the effort of arbitrating ... it has a statutory
right to potentially relevant information necessary to allow it
have merit and whether
to decide if the underlying grievances
47
they should be pursued at all."
In addition, the Board continues to reject deferral arguments
in cases involving interference with access to the Board
itself;4" involving alleged improper employer assistance to
unions;4 9 involving representational issues such as unit

45.
Id. (footnote omitted).
46.
Id.
Safeway Stores Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1126, 1126 n.1, enforced, 622 F.2d 425 (9th
47.
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981); see also NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385
U.S. 432, 436-39 (1967). In General Dynamics Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 1432 (1984), the
NLRB ordered disclosure of a subcontracting study, referring to it as a "procedural
issue" that was merely preliminary to resolution of the substantive dispute: the
grievances challenging the subcontracting itself. Id. at 1432 n.2. The Board also
concluded that deferral would mean the grievance procedure would be subject to
"inevitable delays" and force the union into a "two tiered" grievance resolution
process. Id.
More recently, the NLRB refused to defer a charge involving denial of access to the
plant by union officials where the contract gave a union the right to enter the plant
and investigate grievances. American Nat'l Can Co., Foster-Forbes Glass Div., 924
F.2d 518, 522-23 (4th Cir. 1991), enforcing 293 N.L.R.B. No. 110, slip op. at 7-10, 131
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1153, 1155-56 (Apr. 28, 1989). The union had filed a grievance
complaining of excessive heat in the plant and sought to take temperature readings.
Id. at 521. The Board noted that the arbitrator could not resolve both issues (access
and excessive heat) simultaneously and that forcing the union to arbitrate twice
would be an "unacceptable impediment" to effective representation by the union. Id.
at 523.
See, e.g., Superior Forwarding Co., Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 806, 806 n.1 (1987)
48.
(holding it improper to defer claims brought under NLRA § 8(a)(4) which prohibits
employers from discharging or discriminating against an employee who files charges
with or gives testimony to the Board).
49.
See, e.g., Servair, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1278, 1278 n.1, 1280 (1978) (holding it
improper to defer claims brought under NLRA § 8(a)(4) which prohibits employers
from interfering with the administration of a union), enforced in part, 607 F.2d 258
(9th Cir. 1979), opinion withdrawn and case remanded, 624 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1980).
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clarification;" and cases where the union's interest is adverse to that of the grieving employee.5 1
With these narrow exceptions, however, the NLRB is telling
unions (and workers represented by unions) that the
grievance-arbitration procedure will be the exclusive avenue
for remedying employer conduct during the contract's term.
The moment a collective-bargaining agreement is executed, the
parties lose access to statutory protection from a broad range
of employer misconduct.52

II.

UNION CRITICISM OF

NLRB

DEFERRAL

Our criticism is directed at the broad scope of deferral
reflected in Olin and United Technologies rather than the
deferral doctrine originally stated in Collyer and Spielberg. As
we have mentioned, unions determine their position on

50.
See, e.g., Magna Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 104, 105 n.2 (1982) (holding it improper
to defer decisions determining employee membership in bargaining units).
51.
See, e.g., Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (noting that deference in situations where the interests of the union diverge
from those of the employee may "constitute not deference, but abdication"); Taylor v.
NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516, 1520 n.3, 1521 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891
(1989); see also infra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
52.
Perhaps the most glaring example of this broad loss of statutory protections
is the case of union officials who are singled out for discharge when the employer
believes that they should have more actively discouraged or prevented "wildcat
strikes" or similar types of spontaneous concerted activity by employees. See, e.g.,
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983). By singling out union
officials for harsh discipline in that context, the employer has clearly discriminated
against them based on their participation in union affairs in violation of NLRA
§ 8(a)(3). Id. at 703-05. And yet, if the labor agreement contains a standard "just
cause" limitation on the employer's right to discharge employees, the Board will
refuse to process such a complaint despite the arbitrator's inability to view the
discharge or discipline in light of the specific statutory protection from employer
reprisals for union activity. See, e.g., West Penn Power Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 1160, 116162 (1985) (finding deferral proper although the arbitrator allowed harsher punishment for a union officer). This result deprives the employee of specific statutory
protections of section 8(a)(3).
In Metropolitan Edison, the Supreme Court examined just such a situation and
determined that a standard no-strike clause did not waive the protections of NLRA
§ 8(a)(3) for union officials who fail to take "adequate" measures to prevent violations
of the no-strike clause. 460 U.S. at 707-10. Notwithstanding Metropolitan Edison,
Board doctrine now requires such union officials to pursue reinstatement under the
"just cause" provision of their contract and provides direct Board review of their
discharge only if the arbitrator's failure to reinstate them is "palpably wrong." Olin
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) (citing International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B.
923,924 (1962), affd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1003 (1964)). In our view, the Board has indirectly brought about the result
prohibited by the Court in Metropolitan Edison.
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deferral to some extent by balancing general pro- and
antideferral policies and to some extent by utilizing principled
distinctions applicable in narrower circumstances.53 In Part
A, we will catalog some general deferral considerations, from
both a policy and a practical perspective, and apply those
considerations to certain aspects of the NLRB's recent expansion of its deferral doctrine. Next, in Part B, we will develop
briefly some of the more particularized arguments that, we
believe, should be used to limit the NLRB's deferral policy.
Finally, in Part C, as a prelude to our discussion of the debate
between the labor movement and various individual rights
groups, we explore in more depth some of the broad prodeferral policy arguments.
A. General Considerations

As we have discussed, the competing policy goals in this
debate are the desire to maximize employee protections, from
whatever source, and the desire to encourage the development
of private institutions internal to the union-employee-employer
relationship that are capable of rendering final dispositions of
workplace disputes.54 It is hardly surprising that the labor
movement has been hostile to the Board's expansion of its
deferral policies. The labor movement should be expected to
resist whenever the Board denies an aggrieved party (whether
a union or an individual) access to an alternate forum that can
provide relief from employer actions.
No matter how much a union might wish for a perfect
arbitral mechanism, inevitably arbitrators will make occasional mistakes. The Board, then, should provide a basic
appellate review function in the postarbitral resolution context
even in the most prodeferral of worlds. In our view, the Board
has improperly abdicated even this limited appellate review
function with its expansion of deferral and, in particular, its
adoption of the "palpably wrong" standard. The Board's
standard of reversing only those decisions "not susceptible to
an interpretation consistent with the Act,"55 no matter how

53.
54.
55.

See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3-5, 10-11 and accompanying text.
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 573-74 (1984).
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poorly conceived or how far from application of proper standards, is such a passive standard as to amount to little more
than a rubber stamp of arbitral awards.
This postarbitral standard nearly eliminates any review
based on compliance with applicable statutory standards of
conduct. The "palpably wrong" standard, in combination with
the "factually parallel" test for determining whether the
arbitrator adequately considered the unfair labor practice
issue,56 erodes important substantive protections. Instead of
going to the Board with allegations of unfair labor practices,
the union and its members must now go to an arbitrator,
obtain a determination regarding contract compliance (generally without any regard for statutory standards), and may
invoke Board application of statutory standards only if the
union and employee can prove that the arbitrator's decision is
"palpably wrong" and that the facts presented to the arbitrator
were not "parallel" to those that would be presented to the
Board."
Thus, even though the Board might, if reviewing
employer conduct de novo, find certain employer conduct an
unfair labor practice, that employer conduct will go
unremedied so long as (a) the arbitrator finds no contract
violation and (b) the arbitrator's decision is at least "susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act.""8 The
important postarbitral appellate review function that the
Board served under its prior formulation is thus almost
entirely eliminated.5 9
Because there are some types of remedial orders which only
the Board can impose, current deferral doctrine-in both preand postarbitral contexts-also deprives employees of access
to the full range of remedies fashioned by Congress in the
NLRA. Arbitral authority finds its source in the parties'
contract, and is generally limited to interpreting and applying

56.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
57.
See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
58.
Id.
59.
It is also important to note that, from a union perspective, present deferral
doctrine imposes an improper double standard. Unions find it intolerable that the
Board defers to contractual mechanisms for vindication of employee rights against
employers-thereby diminishing employee protections against employer misconduct-but consistently refuses to defer to internal union mechanisms for vindication
of individual employee rights when the party accused of misconduct is not the
employer but the union itself. See infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
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the agreement.6" An arbitrator has no general authority, for
example, to require that the parties enter into bargaining on
a topic not covered by their agreement. In fact, in a recent
case the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce an arbitral award
because the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by ordering
the parties to rebargain on a previously settled issue.6 ' In
NLRB proceedings, such bargaining orders, in contrast, are
the "usual remedy for an employer's refusal to bargain in
violation of Section 8(a)(5)."6 2
Finally, there are some practical reasons that unions
occasionally prefer NLRB litigation to arbitration. The NLRB
mechanism permits use of discovery and subpoenas.6 3
Because formal discovery in arbitration cases is relatively
rare, parties frequently face the unfortunate burden of
confronting their opponent's evidence for the first time at the
hearing itself.64 Also, a union can challenge employer conduct essentially cost-free through the NLRB; avoiding arbitration costs is undeniably advantageous to a union. The NLRB
provides an attorney at no charge.6 5 The union's often scant
resources are therefore not called upon to enforce statutory
rights and, perhaps more importantly, a union need not make
resource-allocation decisions when considering potential
settlement offers; full vindication of statutory rights may be
pursued regardless of cost.

60.
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) (stating that
arbitrators have "no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the
bargain between the parties").
61.
AP Parts Co. v. UAW, 923 F.2d 488, 491-92 (6th Cir. 1991).
62.

2 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1663 (2d ed. 1983).

Nor do

arbitrators have any statutory authority on which to base "cease and desist" orders
or to require that the employer, by posting appropriate notices in the workplace,
advise employees of the relief ordered. Cf. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53-54
(finding that 'the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of contractual
rights"). The Board, in contrast, has broad statutory authority to do so and will
typically order such cease and desist and notice-posting remedies whenever it finds
that an unfair labor practice has been committed. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988); see
also 2 C. MORRIS, supra, at 1653-55 (cease and desist order), 1655 (notice-posting
requirement).
63.
See 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1988) (subpoena power); see also id. § 160(b) (rules
of evidence applicable under the federal rules of civil procedure shall be followed as
far as practicable).
64.
See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 302-04
(4th ed. 1985).
65.
See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1988); see also A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 106 (10th ed. 1986); 2 C. MORRIS, supra note 62, at
1621.
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B. Analytic Considerations

In addition to the general considerations outlined above, we
believe the labor movement should be critical of some of the
analytical foundations on which recent deferral doctrine is
built. In our view, current doctrine incorrectly fails to
distinguish between NLRA § 8(a)(5) cases and § 8(a)(3) cases.
The Board's conclusion that deferral may be appropriate in
most or all NLRA § 8(a)(5) cases simply does not, in our view,
justify deferral in any NLRA § 8(a)(3) cases.
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, and its companion, section 8(b)(3), impose duties on the employer and the union to
bargain in good faith. The Board and the courts have interpreted this bargaining duty to require not constant bargaining
but rather the creation of a situation in which bargaining
results in a contract setting forth the rights and obligations of
the parties (employer, employee, and union) for some specified
period of time.6 6 During the term of that contract, the
presence of contractual rights and obligations completely
extinguishes the duty to bargain (if the parties have covered
every possible area in their contract or otherwise waived their
respective obligations to bargain during the contract term), or
at least limits the duty to those areas not covered in the
agreement. In short, as the language of section 8(d) makes
clear, once the parties reach an agreement in a particular area
they are entitled to rely on that agreement and need not
bargain on that subject again until the contract expires.6 7
Deferral analysis in NLRA § 8(a)(5) cases, we believe, should
proceed directly from these premises. The existence of a
contract containing a private mechanism for dispute resolution
is, by operation of law, a waiver of the duty to bargain, at
least as to those subjects covered by the agreement. Deferral
of NLRA § 8(a)(5) charges in this context is therefore nothing
more than the Board's recognition of the existence of the
agreement; deferral is not contingent on the substance of that

66.
NLRA § 8(d) provides in part that the duty to bargain does not require
'either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions
contained in a contract for a fixed period .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see infra
notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
67.
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453-54 & n.4
(1957) (noting that Congress intended collective agreements to serve as "valid,
binding and enforceable contracts" during their term).
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agreement. In this context there is no reason for the Board to
scrutinize arbitral resolutions to any great degree because it
is the existence of the contract covering particular topics, and
not the particular substantive terms related to those topics or
their interpretation, that justifies deferral.
In our view, however, even this rationale for deferral of
NLRA § 8(a)(5) cases must be applied with caution. This
rationale assumes that the parties, by executing a collectivebargaining agreement, have waived entirely the application of
the duty to bargain during the term of that agreement, or at
least assumes that the parties have already reached agreement on the area of employer conduct at issue. This waiver
assumption may be generally accurate in typical cases
involving long-standing collective-bargaining relationships and
contracts that cover the entire range of workplace issues.6"
Nevertheless, we believe that the Board should not apply the
deferral doctrine when there is reason to believe that this
assumption is inaccurate.6 9
Although there is no real dispute that the parties may waive
entirely their rights (and duties) to bargain during the term of
a contract, the determination of whether they in fact have
waived those rights (and duties) simply cannot be made by an
arbitrator.7" Instead, that determination is for the Board,

68.
The waiver assumption is further bolstered if the contract contains a "zipper
clause" whereby the parties waive their obligations to bargain during the term of the
agreement and state that the contract is intended to cover all aspects of their
relationship. See, e.g., GTE Automatic Elec. Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 1491, 1491 (1982)
(holding that a zipper clause waived the duty to bargain midterm even over benefits
not existing at the time of bargaining). But cf. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 260 N.L.R.B.
1346 (1982) (holding that a zipper clause will not constitute a waiver of the
employer's duty to bargain on issues to which the employer has made unilateral
modifications or changes).
69.
Nothing requires that collective-bargaining agreements cover any particular
range of topics. See NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988); see also NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958); cf. H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). It is therefore perfectly permissible, for example, for
a contract to cover only wage rates and say nothing about holidays, vacations, health
care, pensions, or any other topic. Whether the parties in such a situation intended
to waive their rights and obligations to bargain over these topics by not including
them in the contract may therefore depend on bargaining history, past practice, or
other factors outside the four corners of the agreement itself.
70.
The question of to what extent, and under what circumstances, a legal right
or obligation may be waived is plainly a legal question implicating questions such as
congressional purpose and policy far beyond the merely contractual questions which
an arbitrator is empowered to decide. For example, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), the Supreme Court held that rights under the
Fair Labor Standards Act are not waivable by contract and a prior arbitral award
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and, we believe, the Board should make that determination in
each case based on applicable contract language and bargaining history. 7 ' The Board should not assume, merely because
there is a contract calling for arbitral resolution of disputes
involving its terms, that the parties intended arbitral relief to
be exclusive and intended to waive their statutory rights and
duties under NLRA § 8(a)(5) in areas not even covered by the
contract.72
The Board has had difficulty formulating a consistent body
of law on the determination of the employer's continuing duty
to bargain during the contract term before unilaterally
changing terms and conditions of employment.7 In our view,
the Board is too quick to assume-based on boilerplate zipper
clauses74 or "management rights" clauses-that the parties

therefore does not preclude subsequent action under the statute. Id. at 740-45. The
duty to bargain is similarly a creature of statute-and not of contract-and it is
therefore the agency-and not the arbitrator-that should determine whether the
right has been effectively waived.
71.
This inquiry into whether the parties covered a particular area of employer
conduct is analogous to the inquiry that courts are required to make in determining
whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate certain disputes prior to enforcing the
arbitration clause. The arbitrability question requires courts to examine the contract
and determine whether the arbitration clause covers the contract dispute at issue,
without requiring a court to decide the merits of the substantive contract interpretation issue itself. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S.
643, 649-50 (1986). Similarly, in deciding whether the parties have covered a
particular area of employer conduct, and thereby eliminated any ongoing duty to
bargain, the Board should examine the contract and determine its breadth of
coverage without determining whether the employer conduct at issue breaches the
contract's substantive provisions.
72.
There is another, independent reason why the Board should apply deferral
policy cautiously to NLRA § 8(a)(5) cases. An employer may, by a series of clearly
arbitrable breaches of the contract, attempt to undermine the union and its value in
the eyes of its members. Although each employer breach may be an ideal candidate
for deferral, the cumulative effect of a series of such breaches may not be entirely
remedied by a series of arbitral awards in favor of the union. Complete redress of the
delays, costs, and general disruptions caused by the employer's conduct may require
applying Board statutory protections and remedies. See supra notes 60-62 and
accompanying text.
73.
Compare Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 686, 687 (1984)
(holding that a zipper clause waives the union's right to bargain over the elimination
of Christmas bonuses that were not specifically provided in the contract where an
integration clause, in effect, extinguished the practice), enforced sub nom. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1466 v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1986) with
Suffolk Child Dev. Center, 277 N.L.R.B. 1345, 1351 (1985) (upholding, without
opinion, administrative law judge's holding that a zipper clause does not waive the
union's right to bargain during the contract over changes in medical benefits where
such benefits continued after the formation of the new contract and the employer did
not make clear that such benefits were covered by the clause).
74.
See supra note 68.
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have waived the duty to bargain during the contract term.7 5
Still, unlike arbitrators, the Board has upheld the duty to
bargain when faced with unilateral employer action on an
item not encompassed by the parties' agreement in the
For
absence of zipper or management rights clauses. 76
example, the Board has recently held that employers cannot
unilaterally impose drug-testing requirements during the term
of a contract without bargaining in most circumstances. 7
Arbitrators, on the other hand, tend to focus only on the
contractual language-or lack thereof-to resolve disputes in
Worse yet, some
areas not covered by the agreement.78
rights"
doctrine, under
arbitrators still cling to the "reserved
which all matters not specifically controlled by the agreement
Thus,
are reserved for unilateral management action. 79

See, e.g., United Technologies Corp., 287 N.L.R.B. 198, 198 (1987) (finding
75.
that boilerplate management rights language justified unilateral change in discipline
procedure), modified on othergrounds, 292 N.L.R.B. 248, enforced, 884 F.2d 1569 (2d
Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has determined that alleged waivers of statutory
obligations must be. supported by "clear and unmistakable" contract language.
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). In addition, there are
some categories of NLRA rights-for example, rights necessary for the exercise of free
choice in selecting a bargaining agent-that cannot be waived at all. See NLRB v.
Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). Traditional zipper and management rights
clauses are generally proposed by employers as boilerplate language. By agreeing to
such language in that context we do not believe that the union has knowingly waived
its statutory protections. In fact, in the drug testing context, the Board requires
either extremely specific contractual waiver language or evidence that a party "consciously explored ...

and ...

consciously yielded or clearly and unmistakably waived

its interest" regarding drug testing policies before the Board will find a waiver of the
right to bargain over employer efforts to implement drug testing. Johnson-Bateman
Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, slip op. at 15, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1393, 1398 (June 15, 1989).
76.
See, e.g., Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 757, 757-58 (1977) (holding that
an employer committed a NLRA § 8(a)(5) violation, during the contract term, by
unilaterally instituting a production quota and disciplinary system to be immediately
enforced without offering the union an opportunity to bargain), enforced in pertinent
part, Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978).
See discussion of Johnson-Bateman,supra note 75 and infra note 79.
77.
78.
Arbitrators do not, for example, view their role as enforcing the duty to
bargain because they are "limited by the common prohibition that the arbitrator not
add to, subtract from, or modify the [collective-bargaining] agreement." F. ELKOURI
& E. ELKOURI, supra note 64, at 473.
One classic statement of this doctrine is found in Vacaville Unified School
79.
Dist., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1026, 1028 (1978):
It is a well recognized arbitral principal [sic] that the Collective Bargaining
Agreement imposes limitations on the employer's otherwise unfettered right to
manage the enterprise. Except as expressly restricted by the Agreement, the
employer retains the right of management. This is known as the Reserved
Right Doctrine ....

Id. at 1028 (Brisco, Arb.); see also St. Louis Symphony Soc'y, 70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 475,
482 (1978) (Roberts, Arb.) (asserting that "[t]he significance of contractual silence on
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a particular subject matter is that the contract does not impose a limitation or
obligation upon management, so that management is therefore free to act as it
pleases with the rights of a common law employer"); Fairway Foods, Inc., 44 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 161, 164 (1965) (Solomon, Arb.). See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
supra note 64, at 457-63. In our view, the reserved rights doctrine improperly places
the burden on a union to anticipate-and contractually prohibit-virtually any type
of potential employer unilateral action. For example, where the employer has always
provided free on-site parking to employees, should the union be required to anticipate
and contractually prohibit the possibility that the employer will decide that she can
make good money by charging employees for parking? Under the reserved rights
theory, the union's failure to do so would create the risk that the employer, in
reliance on its "reserved rights," will begin to charge employees for parking. The
range of potential employer unilateral conduct is limited only by the employer's
imagination or willingness to create mischief.
In addition, as Arthur Goldberg, former Supreme Court Justice and former
General Counsel of the United Steelworkers of America, has observed, the reserved
rights doctrine "overlooks the degree to which collective bargaining modifies workers'
rights-the right to cease work, the right to press a point without regard to any set
of rules or guides, [and] the right to improvise concepts of fairness . . . ." Goldberg,
Management's Reserved Rights: A Labor View, 9 ANN. NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. PROC.
118, 122 (J. McKelvey ed. 1956). In giving up their rights, workers legitimately
expect a degree of mutuality: that management too is committed to the process of
collective bargaining and abandons its right to act unilaterally and arbitrarily. This
issue arose most recently in the context of unilaterally imposed drug testing policies.
It is the UAW's position that such programs cannot be implemented during the
contract term without prior bargaining. Letter from Owen Bieber to all local unions,
40 UAW Administrative Letters, no. 1 (Jan. 10, 1990); Letter from Owen Bieber to
all local unions, 36 UAW Administrative Letters, no. 8 (Sept. 17, 1986). The NLRB
has generally agreed with this position. See, e.g., Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B.
No. 26, slip op. at 15, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1393, 1398 (June 15, 1989). But cf. Star
Tribune, Div. of Cowles Media Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 63, slip op. at 8, 15,131
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1404, 1407, 1409 (June 15, 1989) (holding that drug testing of
applicants for employment is not a mandatory subject for bargaining and can be
implemented unilaterally).
In our view, it is much more sensible, as a general rule, to impose the burden of
showing that a changed working condition comports with the labor contract on the
party seeking to implement a change. Unilateral changes are prohibited during nocontract periods in the absence of a bargaining impasse. Why should the result be
any different during the contract period? If there is no contract language to support
the change, the employer should be required to bargain before unilaterally changing
terms and conditions of employment, unless the contract clearly waives bargaining
rights and obligations during its term. See Suffolk Child Dev. Center, 277 N.L.R.B.
1345, 1349-50 (1985) (affirming, without opinion, the administrative law judge's
finding that unilateral changes in medical benefits without a clear and unmistakable
waiver constitute a NLRA § 8(a)(5) violation); cf. Southern Fla. Hotel & Motel Ass'n,
245 N.L.R.B. 561, 567-69 & n.22 (1979) (holding that contractual provision giving
employer authority to "change such reasonable rules and regulations as it deems
necessary" does not permit unilateral changes in those rules that alter compensation),
enforced in relevant part, 751 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1985).
In fact, three compelling arguments can be made that the employer should not
enjoy any right to implement changes unilaterally following a bargaining impasse
during the contract term. First, allowing unilateral action by an employer during a
period in which the union is bound not to strike would create an anomalous result.
This is so for the simple reason that no-strike clauses in labor contracts generally
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although we are not entirely satisfied with the Board's efforts
to develop legal standards in this area, the Board, unlike an
arbitrator, at least makes some effort to determine whether
unilateral employer action violates the duty to bargain.
Clearly, none of the arguments outlined above justify
application of the NLRB's deferral doctrine in cases involving
alleged violation of the NLRA § 8(a)(3) statutory protection
from employer reprisals for union activity. In that circumstance, Congress has determined that employees must enjoy
a particular protection; ° there is no reason to conclude that
such protection becomes irrelevant when bargaining has
produced a contract. Although the parties may duplicate those
statutory protections with contractual language prohibiting
discharge or discipline except for just cause, or even with
language prohibiting employer reprisals for union activity, the
statute remains, in our view, an important source of independent protection.
In analogous contexts, the Supreme Court has held that
duplication of statutory protections in a labor agreement do
not make statutory protections inoperable. In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,81 for example, the Court allowed an
employee to pursue a remedy under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196482 despite an arbitrator's failure to find
that the employer had violated the "no discrimination" clause

deprive unions of their strike weapon during contract terms. See NLRB v. Lion Oil
If unilateral employer action is allowed,
Co., 352 U.S. 282, 290-91 (1957).
decisionmakers should find an implied exception to such no-strike clauses so that a
union will have access to its traditional economic weapon when faced with unilateral
employer action. In the alternative, unions would certainly bargain for limitations
on such no-strike clauses. Second, if a labor contract contains a "zipper clause," the
employer, as well as the union, has waived its right to bargain during the contract
term. The employer's waiver of this right should also be viewed as a waiver of its
"right" to make unilateral changes. Finally, allowing unilateral changes (without
either an express or implied limitation on the no-strike clause) would certainly
undermine the national labor policy of stable labor relations during the contract's
term. See supra note 3.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988) (unfair labor practice for employer to
80.
discriminate against employee on basis of union activity). The Supreme Court has
in fact noted that the NLRA not only created important substantive protections, but
also "confide[d] primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and
specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation,
complaint and notice, and hearing and decision." Garner v. Teamsters Local Union
No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
81.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
82.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1988).
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of the collective-bargaining agreement. 3 As the GardnerDenver Court explained, "the arbitrator's task is to effectuate
the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the
collective bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and
apply that agreement .. .,.4
In addition, arbitrators have
"no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with
the bargain between the parties."8 5 Finally, if an arbitrator
does base her decision on statutory provisions rather than on
the bargaining agreement, she "has 'exceeded the scope of the
submission,' and the award will not be enforced."8
An
arbitral resolution of a contractual dispute, therefore, is
entirely beside the point when considering whether an
employee has been afforded the statutory protections under
NLRA § 8(a)(3) fashioned by Congress. 7

83.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59-60; see also McDonald v. City of West
Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290-92 (1984) (holding that federal courts may not apply
res judicata or collateral estoppel to the arbitrator's decision against the employee
who sought a remedy for a first amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding that an
employee can maintain a federal claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, even though he had previously and unsuccessfully sought the
same remedy from a grievance committee established by the collective-bargaining
agreement). But see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652,
1656-57 (1991) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate "any dispute, claim, or
controversy" involving employment limited the employee to an arbitral forum and
waived the employee's right to pursue a statutory claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634). We do not believe that one can
argue successfully that the rights at issue under the NLRA are different in kind from
those protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the FLSA, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988). The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the NLRA (like Title VII, FLSA,
and section 1983, in our view) protects important "public" rights. National Licorice
Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 362 (1940).
84.
415 U.S. at 53.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960)).
87.
Where a federal or state statute creates independent rights, the labor
movement has not hesitated to support individual employee access to those statutory
protections even during the term of a labor agreement that addresses some of the same
issues. The AFL-CIO, for example, filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
plaintiff-employee in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 400-01
(1988). The Lingle Court agreed with the AFL-CIO's arguments and determined that
a "just cause" clause and its enforceability under section 301 did not preempt
application of a state law prohibiting discharge of an employee for filing workers'
compensation claims. Id. at 411-13. In Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326,
1328 n.1 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989), the UAW filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of an employee who sought to enforce Michigan's Handicapper's
Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 37.1101-.1605 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
The employer in that case argued that application of the state law should be preempted
because enforcement would require the state court to interpret the terms of the
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Although Gardner-Denverundermines application of deferral
to those cases involving NLRA § 8(a)(3)'s protections, the
Gardner-Denver analogy goes only so far. It does not, we
believe, assist those critics of the deferral doctrine who would
mount a wholesale challenge and argue that Collyer Insulated
Wire88 and Spielberg Manufacturing Co." were wrongly
decided.9" Gardner-Denver and its progeny rejected deferral
arguments because the individual rights at issue in those cases
were themselves objects of specific statutory protection. 91 By
contrast, the rights protected under the rubric of the NLRA's
duty to bargain are not ends in themselves, but only a mechanism to encourage and protect the formation of labor agreements.9 2 The Court in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best FreightSystem, Inc. ," for example, noted this very distinction when
it contrasted rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) with those protected by the NLRA: "The rights
established through this system of majority rule [collective
bargaining under the NLRA] are thus 'protected not for their
own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of
minimizing industrial strife "by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 151.""'
UAW/Chrysler labor agreement. 879 F.2d at 1331-32. The plaintiffs, in contrast,
argued-and the court held-that the state statute created independent rights the
application of which should not be withheld merely because the employee was also
covered by a labor agreement that in large measure duplicated the state law
protections. Id. at 1331, 1334.
192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
88.
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
89.
Recall that Collyer and Spielberg approved deferral only in the context of
90.
NLRA § 8(a)(5) duty to bargain allegations. See supra notes 21-25, 38-39 and
accompanying text.
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,51-52 (1974) (holding that
91.
although "a union may waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity,"
rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represent "a congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices" and, therefore, are
'not susceptible of prospective waiver").
To some extent, the same observation can be made about the right to be free
92.
from employer retaliation for union activity. That right is designed not only to protect
individual employees from unjust treatment on the job, but also to protect and
encourage employees in their efforts to engage in concerted activity, with the result
being the formation of labor organizations. As should be obvious from our discussion,
we do not believe that the prohibition on reprisals provided in NLRA § 8(a)(3) can be
accomplished by signing a collective-bargaining agreement in the same way that the
duty to bargain provided in NLRA § 8(a)(5) may be entirely accomplished with the
signing of an agreement. Thus, the value of NLRA § 8(a)(3)'s protections are not made
superfluous when an agreement is signed; therefore, we believe that there is no reason
for agency enforcement of those protections to cease with the signing of a labor contract.
450 U.S. 728 (1981).
93.
Id. at 735 (quoting Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
94.
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975)).
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C. Additional Considerations

Even from a union perspective, there are strong policy and
practical considerations that lend support to broad deferral
doctrines. Any policy that provides a remedy outside of a
collectively bargained grievance procedure weakens that
procedure's authority. If the procedure can be bypassed, its
usefulness is reduced in the eyes of the employees. Moreover,
these results would weaken and marginalize unions. Elected
union officers bargain contracts and are generally the exclusive channel through which those contracts can be enforced.
To weaken or limit the scope of those procedures, therefore,
weakens the union and its role in workplace governance. In
contrast, the exclusivity of the grievance procedure and the
finality of arbitration promote union power and effectiveness.95 Such exclusivity also furthers the fundamental labor
96
policy goal of industrial stability.
Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit has expressed, both from
the bench and as a commentator, the view that collectivebargaining agreements operate as a waiver of all otherwiseavailable statutory rights under the NLRA 7 This approach,

95.
See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community. Org., 420 U.S.
50, 67 (1975) (suggesting that in order to protect the solidarity of the union, members
must pursue their individual complaints of discrimination against the employer
through the grievance-arbitration procedure established by the collective-bargaining
agreement. Otherwise the strength of the union, the employees' ability to reduce
discriminatory practices, and the role of the collective-bargaining agreement would
be undermined); see also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
96.
See The Steelworkers Trilogy (United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (indicating that when a court is asked
to enforce the contractual duty to arbitrate it should not attempt to interpret the
collective-bargaining agreement but should leave that task to the parties' chosen
arbitrator); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960) (agreeing to be bound by arbitration promotes industrial stability and peace);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)
(stating that because parties agreed to have arbitrator interpret the collectivebargaining agreement, courts have "no business" overruling the bargained-for
arbitrator's decision because their interpretation of the agreement may be different.
Such action would make meaningless the contractual provision that the arbitral
decision is final.)); see also Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265
(1964) (indicating that arbitration, a voluntary settlement of labor-management
disputes, gives substance to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements and
may end disputes and controversies); cf. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S.
693, 708 (1983) (stating that the grievance-arbitration procedure is "an integral part
of the collective-bargaining process").
97.
See Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("The parties to the collective agreement chose to supplant
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we believe, has merit. The ability of unions to bargain for
broad contractual protections-and thereby eliminate the need
to resort to the generally narrower statutory protections of the
NLRA-is indeed a source of union strength. Nevertheless,
with all due respect to Judge Edwards, we believe that his
approach goes too far in assuming, for example, that the
existence of a general "just cause" protection, and its enforceability through private means, should in every instance be
deemed to supplant access to the specific statutory protections
created by Congress in the NLRA.
In any event, the Board's present deferral doctrine does not
seem to be based on a waiver analysis. A waiver analysis, for
example, would require an inquiry into the extent of the
purported waiver of statutory rights. Such analysis should
also either allow for the possibility of a complete waiver of
statutory rights or explain why such complete waivers will not
be tolerated. If complete waivers are allowed, there would be
no need for the "clearly repugnant" aspect of Board deferral
doctrine whenever the parties have completely waived reliance
on statutory rights. The Board, however, has refrained from
establishing this sort of sliding scale of deference based on the
extent of the waiver, and instead universally applies the
"clearly repugnant" standard.9 8
This analysis is plainly
inconsistent with a waiver-based deferral policy.
The NLRB's deferral doctrine in prearbitral settings can also
be justified largely by analogy to ripeness doctrines. Until the
collectively-bargained mechanism for resolution of the parties'
contractual rights and duties has run its course, the employer's conduct remains, in an important sense, nascent.
Because an employer's or union's action may yet be reversed
by a process which, for legal purposes, is internal to the
employer-employee relationship, a very strong argument can
be made that a legal cause of action has not even accrued.9 9
Moreover, delaying Board intervention also serves the salutary
purpose of allowing the parties to attempt private resolution

Giving legal
statutory rights with analogous rights created under the contract ....
effect to that agreement respects the private ordering of rights and responsibilities
established through collective bargaining, and fosters the strong labor policy of
promoting industrial peace through arbitration."); see also Edwards, supra note 6, at
28-32.
98.
See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
99.
See, e.g., Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir.
1989) (noting that a duty of fair representation cause of action cannot arise while
arbitration is still in progress).
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of their dispute. The party seeking Board relief may well be
satisfied with the arbitral result and may decline to seek
further relief. In such cases, delaying Board action avoids
wasting Board resources and, most importantly, promotes the
integrity of the arbitral process.
Many of the broad policy concerns implicated in the area of
deferral have already been examined by the Supreme Court in
the context of enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements
themselves. In this context, the Court has properly determined that the parties must be required to exhaust the
available contractual mechanisms for obtaining final contract
interpretations before they may seek direct judicial enforcement of their agreement.' 0 0 The only exception to this
exhaustion rule occurs when a worker demonstrates that the
union breached its duty to fairly represent the employee in its
handling of the employee's grievance.1"'
The Supreme Court decisions on the exhaustion rule,
however, all involve disputes originally concerning enforcement of rights created by the labor contract itself rather than
rights created by statute.1 0 2 Although these decisions speak
broadly in terms of private dispute resolution, the particular
arguments supported by these cases simply do not apply when
the rights at issue find their source not in the contract, but in

100. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53, 656 (1965)
(noting the general federal rule that an employee cannot maintain an action against
employers for severance pay prior to exhausting grievance procedures, including
arbitration); cf United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62 (1981) (holding
that when an employee files a joint complaint against his union for breach of duty of
fair representation and against his employer for breach of contract, the complaint
must be brought within the statute of limitations period for vacating arbitration
awards because he must show the breach of duty before reaching the merits of the
contract claim); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976)
(holding that an arbitration decision will not be enforced, despite a finality provision
in the contract, where the employee was unfairly represented by the union at the
arbitration hearing).
101.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-86 (1967). The Court also recently
decided that such deference to the parties' "chosen" means of contract interpretation
does not extend to contractual processes which culminate, not in arbitral interpretation of the contract, but in the union's ability to conduct a strike in defense of
its interpretation of the contract. Groves v. Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener
Div., 111 S. Ct. 498, 503 (1990). The Groves Court reasoned that congressional
preference extends only to methods of contract interpretation and not to the
availability of economic force to encourage one's opponent to concede defeat. Id. at
502-03. The UAW in that case argued successfully that the union and its members
should have access to direct judicial enforcement despite the availability of the strike
weapon. Id. at 503.
102. See supra notes 100-01.
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the law. These decisions turn largely on the Court's observation that arbitral resolution of contract disputes is appropriate
because the parties, by entering into their contract, agreed not
only to certain substantive provisions but also to a "system of
private law" for enforcing those substantive provisions. °3
As the Court has properly noted, the grievance and arbitration
process would lose much of its force and integrity if its
mechanisms were not exclusive and its results not final. 4
Respect for the contract, therefore, dictates that courts allow
the parties' chosen system of contract interpretation to run its
course prior to judicial intervention. Respect for the statute,
we believe, similarly requires that access to the administrative
agency charged with enforcing its provisions not be withheld.
Finally, we should admit that current Board deferral
doctrine does not entirely ignore the statutory policies of the
Act. Thus, Board review does remain available to overrule
arbitral results when those results are clearly wrong.05
Although this standard, we believe, is much too forgiving,
Board review remains a significant safety valve. Also, from an
administrative standpoint, broad NLRB deferral prevents
unjustifiable forum shopping and duplicative litigation over
0
what are often the same factual disputes."
Before we complain too long over loss of access to the NLRB,
we should also, as union advocates, remind ourselves that the
Board's own processes are far from ideal. Criticizing deferral,
after all, suggests a preference for Board review and, to some
extent, reduces the incentive for unions to obtain the greatest
possible contractual protections in areas which the Board may
otherwise cover. A brief review of the NLRB's case-processing
record is, therefore, in order.
The NLRB conducts an administrative investigation of all
unfair labor practice charges to determine if at least a prima
facie case exists. 0 7 Approximately two-thirds of all charges

103. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,581
(1960).
104. See Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653.
105. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
106. The risk of duplicative litigation may be eliminated in large part, however,
by a narrower doctrine deferring only to arbitral resolution of factual disputes and
allowing the arbitral application of the distinct, albeit occasionally overlapping,
normative standards of contract and statute. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 & n.21 (1974).
107. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.4, .18, .22-.23 (1991); 1 NLRB, CASE HANDLING MANUAL,
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS 10050-64 (1989). See generally T. KAMMHOLZ
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are dismissed as lacking merit before reaching the complaint
Once a complaint is issued, litigation before the
stage.'
NLRB remains a relatively slow, highly procedural, multiappeal process.10 9 Fully litigated cases usually take two to
three years from the date the charge is filed until an enforceable order is issued by a court of appeals."' By contrast,
arbitration is relatively quick and final, and arbitrators almost
always quickly dispose of procedural issues and reach the
merits."'
Furthermore, the NLRB does not assume jurisdiction over
all allegations of improper discipline. Although the working
public apparently still believes that the NLRB has general
jurisdiction to resolve most workplace disputes, the harsh
reality is that the agency's jurisdiction is confined to specific
statutory prohibitions of employer or union conduct that
substantially affects commerce. 1 2 In addition, the charging
party has the burden of establishing a prima facie case based
on retaliation for engaging in protected "concerted activities."" 3 These jurisdictional limits, and the burden on the
charging party to demonstrate a prima facie case without full
opportunity for discovery, mean that for every fifty-five
employee inquiries the Board files a complaint in only one." 4

& S. STRAUSS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD 6.09 (1987).
108. See 35 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1989); see also Collyer, A View From the Inside,
in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY 385, 387 (C.J. Morris ed. 1987); Dotson, ProcessingCases
at the NLRB, 35 LAB. L.J. 3, 3 (1984). Of these cases that are found to be of merit,
approximately 95 percent are settled. Collyer, supra at 387; Dotson, supra at 3.
109. See Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation: Reflections of a
Judge, 35 ANN. NAT'L ACAD. OF ARB. PROC. 16, 23-24 (J. Stern & B. Dennis eds.
1983); see also K. MCGuINESS, HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD § 22 (1976).
110. See generally Dotson, supra note 108, at 5; Edwards, supra note 109, at 23.
In fact, Rosemary Collyer, a former General Counsel to the NLRB, testified recently
that full litigation of the unfair labor practice charges in the Greyhound case would
take between eight and twelve years. See Responses of the Official Steering
Committee for Greyhound Noteholders in Opposition to Emergency Motion of
National Labor Relations Board for Stay Pending Appeal, at 2, In re Eagle Bus Mfg.,
Inc., No. 90-00985-B-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.) (Oct. 23, 1991).
111. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 64, at 7, 9.
112. NLRA § 10(a) provides that "[t]he Board is empowered ... to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in [NLRA § 8]) affecting
commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1988). In practice, the Board has exercised its
jurisdiction only in those cases that substantially affect commerce.
See K.
McGuINESS, supra note 109, at 33.
113. See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
114. Although the Board reports almost 200,000 "informational contacts" each
year, only approximately 33,000 charges are actually filed each year and only
approximately 3600 complaints are issued. See 35 NLRB ANN. REP. 4, 11 (1989).

674

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL.

24:3 & 4

Moreover, as the recent Meyers Industries, Inc."5 case
demonstrates, the NLRB's definition of protected concerted
activity under NLRA § 7 has not been sympathetic to individual
employees."6 Under Meyers, protected concerted activity
must either be some form of group activity (i.e., more than one
employee involved in some form of protest over terms and
conditions of employment) or individual conduct which is an
extension of previous concerted action (e.g., pursuing a grievance under a collective-bargaining agreement). 1 7 In the
Meyers case, Steve Prill, a lone over-the-road truck driver,
believed that his truck was so poorly maintained that driving
it was a safety risk."' When a problem arose during a trip,
he refused to drive the truck. Although such action, if
conducted by more than one employee acting in concert, would
be the type of protected "concerted activit[y]" immune from
employer reprisal under section 7 of the NLRA, the
Board-despite amicus support from the UAW for Mr.
Prill-determined that his activity was not protected because
he had not attempted to involve other employees in his
efforts. 9
Finally, the Board's remedial authority-although in some
areas broader than an arbitrator's °-is in other important
ways more limited. For instance, the NLRB, in contrast to

115.
268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984) (Meyers I), remanded sub. nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755
F.2d 941, 956 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).
116. Id. at 496-97 (adopting the standard that a single employee does not initiate
or engage in concerted activity under NLRA § 7 when she complains of an employer
violation of state workplace safety law even though the law necessarily protects all
workers in the state); see also Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 884 (1986)
(Meyers H) (reaffirming the Board's definition of concerted activities in Meyers I and
dismissal of the employee's claim), enforced sub. nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
117. See Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 494-97; Meyers I, 281 N.L.R.B. at 884-85.
118. Meyers 1, 268 N.L.R.B. at 505, 507.
119. Meyers I, 268 N.L.R.B. at 497-99. In NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465
U.S. 822 (1984), the Supreme Court upheld a prior Board's ruling that individual
employee action to enforce contractual provisions is protected concerted activity
because such activity partakes of the collective actions that led to those provisions
initially. Id. at 831-32. The Board and the courts have also been somewhat
unsympathetic to collective employee action outside traditional union channels. In
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975), the
Supreme Court agreed with the Board and held that picketing to protest the union's
ineffective processing of a civil rights grievance was not protected activity because
the employees were attempting to circumvent their union and bargain directly with
their employer. Id. at 57-58, 67-73.
120. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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arbitrators, generally will not apply equitable considerations to
modify a penalty in discharge cases.' 2 ' The importance of the
arbitrator's power in this respect cannot be over-emphasized.
The arbitrator's reinstatement-without-backpay remedy has
saved many workers from industrial capital punishment.1 2 2
By comparison, almost any degree of employee misconduct
would compel a different result at the NLRB.

III. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS V. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS:
DEFERRAL AND THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

The Public Citizen Litigation Group has crusaded against
NLRB deferral policy in a variety of forums with mixed
results. Their approach met with some success before a panel
of the Eleventh Circuit 2 3 but was recently rejected by the
D.C. Circuit sitting en banc.'24 In Hammontree, a member
of the Teamsters alleged that he was unpopular with the
elected local union leadership and that he was threatened with
and received discriminatory treatment after successfully
pursuing a grievance regarding dispatching practices. 2 '
Following its investigation, the NLRB issued a complaint on
Mr. Hammontree's behalf.'2 6 An administrative law judge
(ALJ) endorsed a grievance committee finding of employer
violations of NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).' 2 7 Upon reviewing
121. Although the Board may, for example, have statutory discretion to award
reinstatement without backpay, it has generally failed to do so, making discharge
cases virtually all-or-nothing propositions. Although section 10(c) of the NLRA allows
the Board to order "reinstatement of employees with or without backpay," 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1988), the Board has declined to modify employer discipline as a means of
resolving disputes. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1975)
('[Tihe Board, since its inception, has awarded backpay as a matter of course ...
122. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 64, at 688.
123. In Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891
(1989), the panel held that the Board's standard of deferral under Olin Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984), by presuming until proven otherwise that an arbitrator
fully confronted the unfair labor practice at issue, did not sufficiently protect
individual rights. Taylor, 786 F.2d at 1521-22. The panel remanded for reconsideration, after noting that there was no evidence that the arbitrator had considered the
unfair labor practice claim. Id.
124. Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(affirming the Board's broad deferral policy).
125. Id. at 1488-89 n.1; see also id. at 1505-06 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1489.
127. Id.
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the AL's decision, the NLRB dismissed the complaint, holding
that Mr. Hammontree could have pursued the matter under
128
the antidiscrimination provisions of the labor agreement.
A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit blasted the NLRB's
deferral policies on almost every score.12 9 On rehearing en
banc, however, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the panel decision and held that the NLRB
was within the range of its discretion in deferring to the
arbitration proceeding." °
The majority rehearing Hammontree based its decision in
part on the distinction between pre- and postarbitration
deferral.' 3 ' Deferring prior to arbitration, the court reasoned, does not deny access to the NLRB; such access is merely
delayed.' 3 2 Although this observation is certainly true, we do
not believe that it justifies development of significantly more
relaxed standards for deferral in the prearbitration context.

128. Id. As an aside, it appears that the Board decision was inconsistent with
both prior deferral decisions and the NLRB General Counsel Guideline Memorandum
concerning United Technologies Corporation, Gen. Couns. Mem. 84-5 (Mar. 6, 1984),
reprinted in 1984 Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 344. The General Counsel Memorandum
states that deferral should not occur where the respondent allegedly has "engaged in
conduct designed to interfere with employee rights to resort to the grievancearbitration machinery." Gen. Couns. Mem. 84-5, at T V, reprinted in 1984 Lab. Rel.
Y.B. (BNA) at 345.
129. Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438, 443-44, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating
that NLRB deferral policy was improper because: (1) the deferral of unfair practice
claims which exist independently of any contractual rights contradicts Supreme Court
precedent in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), Barrentine v.
Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981), and McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); and (2) because the deferral of individual discrimination
cases is inconsistent with "congressional commands that such cases be given priority
treatment"), vacated, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
130.
Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc). Judge
Edwards, writing separately, expressed his view that the existence of a collectivebargaining agreement constitutes a waiver of the substantive protections found in the
NLRA. Id. at 1502 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Mikva, in lone dissent, adopted
the arguments put forth by the Public Citizen Litigation Group. His dissent features
a lively, but in our view gratuitous, discussion of "union bureaucrats," the "risk of
collusion between unions and employers," "union bosses," and, inexplicably, "crooks
and racketeers in the labor movement." Id. at 1507-11 (Mikva, J., dissenting). Mikva
then concludes that, because Mr. Hammontree alleged that his interests were adverse
to those of his union, deferral was inappropriate. Id. at 1516. Mikva further accepts
the argument made in this Article that section 8(a)(3) creates independent statutory
rights which are not subsumed into a collective-bargaining agreement but continue
to have independent vitality even while such an agreement is in effect. Id. at 1515.
131.
925 F.2d at 1496-97.
132. Id. This rationale, if applied literally, would apply equally to grievances by
union dissidents. The Court, however, indicated approval of the NLRB's exception
for individuals whose interests are "adverse" to those of their union. Id. at 1498-99.
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If the arbitration decision, when issued, is not to be given
preclusive effect or deference, access
to the Board should not
133
be delayed to await that decision.
The NLRB's deferral policies implicate a central issue that
has separated the trade union movement from individual
rights groups such as the Association for Union Democracy
and the Public Citizen Litigation Group. If employee rights
under NLRA § 7 are the ends we seek, then protection of those
rights should not be deferred to private mechanisms. If,
however, these individual rights are primarily tools for
establishing and strengthening the collective rights of workers
to bargain with their employers in a unified and organized
fashion, then a deferral policy must be judged also by whether
it encourages the expansion of collective bargaining
which,
34
after all, is the very purpose of the NLRA.1
As advocates for the labor movement, we believe that-just
as the forces of capital are organized by the invisible hands of
the marketplace and the profit motive-the forces of labor
must be organized into a coordinated, unified, and potent
force. We also believe that history demonstrates that without
such organization the working class will survive only as an
overlooked, exploited, and powerless appendage to the
marketplace. Individual rights, although of obvious importance, draw their value in this context largely by enabling
individuals to organize their activities in a coordinated fashion
to confront the already-organized forces which would seek to
deprive them of economic security and a decent worklife.
To oversimplify a bit for dramatic purposes, we can ask the
question of how best to address the economic and social
imbalances of our system. When workers face the corporate/political Goliath, is it better to have each worker launch
an individual attack armed with his sling and stone of

133. Of course, there are some reasons for delaying access to the Board. The
arbitration award may satisfy all parties and each may decline to seek NLRB review
of that award. In addition, delaying Board action allows arbitration to occur and
work its "therapeutic" function, possibly obviating the need for further intervention.
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). Even so, we do
not believe that these possibilities are sufficiently forceful to justify development of
a relaxed standard of deferral in a prearbitration context unless the award, when
issued, receives a similar degree of deference.
134. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) ("It is declared hereby to be the policy
of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining . . . ."); see also supra note 3.
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individual statutory protections? Or are those workers more
likely to succeed if they confront their adversary with discipline and unity, deciding together whether to hold or charge?
The lone David is romantic, and heroic, and therefore appealing. Unfortunately, except in the Bible, the lone David almost
always dies a quick death at the hands of his oversized
adversary.
Fundamental differences between advocates of individual
and collective rights will probably never be reconciled. Both
individual rights groups 135 and the trade union movement 136 earnestly claim to support both strong unions and
union democracy. Although these principles are not by any
means mutually exclusive, they do compete on occasion and
therefore some balance must be struck. The eternal debate
between groups like the Association for Union Democracy and
the labor movement is over where to place that balance.
This brings us to the specific subject of the impact of
deferral on union reform. The concerns of union reformers
usually arise in situations where an employer disciplines a
political dissident and an incumbent rival controls the
grievance. 137 In our view, the NLRB should not defer where
animosity between the individual grievant and her bargaining
agent implicates the union's duty of fair representation.
Deferral in this context is appropriate only if both parties are
willing to arbitrate and the arbitral process is not likely to be
potentially tainted by the perception of animosity between
grievant and union officer. The NLRB will not defer where
the union declines to pursue the grievance or where "the
interests of the union are adverse to those of the charging

135. See, e.g., Union Financial and Administrative Practices and Procedures:
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1115, 1119-21 (1958) (statement of Patrick Murphy
Malin, Executive Director, ACLU).
136. See, e.g., Labor-ManagementReform Legislation: Hearings on S. 505 Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1959) (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department
of Legislation, AFL-CIO, citing AFL-CIO Codes of Ethical Practices).
137. For an illustration of this scenario, see the discussion of the Hammontree
case, supra note 125 and accompanying text. If the Board returned to its prior
doctrine, under which NLRA § 8(a)(3) cases were not subject to deferral to begin with,
see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text, this potential problem would arise only
in the narrow context of section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain charges; the right of any
employee to pursue full statutory relief under section 8(a)(3) would not be limited at
all. The discussion that follows, however, deals with Board doctrine in its current
form.
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party-employee.""'8
Unfortunately, the NLRB in practice
apparently requires a rather strong showing of animosity
between the grievant and the union.'3 9
We agree entirely with the Public Citizen Litigation Group
that, where hostility exists between the union and a grievant,
the NLRB should not defer. 4 ° If the NLRB is willing to
relieve unions of the duty of handling the disciplinary case of
an alleged dissident, a union would be well-advised to step
aside.
The UAW publishes Administrative Letters on union policy
matters which are binding on staff and local unions. The
UAW's administrative letters concerning fair representation
have advised that, if a situation develops where a union
official controls the grievance of an ideological or political
adversary, the union official should recuse herself from the
decision-making process. 4 ' The UAW typically has established procedures so that if the union official cannot recuse
herself, the grievance will be processed to the next level
automatically where it will generally be handled by a different
union official.14 2 Once a grievance reaches the third step, in

138. Gen. Couns. Mem. 84-5, supra note 128, at T VII, reprintedin 1984 Lab. Rel.
Y.B. (BNA) at 386.
139. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 1252, 1252, 1255
(1988) (holding that deferral to the grievance-arbitration procedure is appropriate
even though employee had made grievances that the union at one time had agreed
not to bring), petition for review denied sub nom. Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d
1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc).
140. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 6, at 490-92.
141. See Bieber, GrievanceHandlingand the Union'sDuty of FairRepresentation,
38 UAW ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER No. 4, at 4 (1988); Woodcock, Grievance Handling
and the Union's Duty of FairRepresentation, 25 UAW ADMINISTRATIVE LETTER No.
5, at 3 (1973).
142. The grievance procedure found in the UAW-Ford Motor Company contract
is entirely typical. It provides for the handling of all grievances through a four stage
process. See 1 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN UAW AND THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, art.
VII, at 43-65 (Oct. 7, 1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). The first stage consists of two "oral discussion steps," first between the
grievant and his or her district committeeperson and immediate supervisor. See id.
art. VII, §§ 2(a)-(b), at 43-45. District committeepersons are the elected local union
officials with responsibility for handling first stage grievances arising in their
district. See id. art. VI, § 11(a), at 36. The second oral discussion requires
involvement of the plant superintendent or other designated management officials.
See id. art. VII, § 2, at 43-44. If not satisfactorily resolved at this first stage, the
grievance proceeds to the second stage which involves written reports by the "Unit
Committee" of elected local union leadership. See id. art. VII, § 3, at 43-44. In the
third stage, voluntary resolution is attempted between the chairperson of the local
union's bargaining committee on behalf of the grievant and the Plant Review Board
on behalf of management. See id. art. VII, § 4, at 46-49. This stage requires written
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fact, it will generally be handled by a representative 143
of the
International Union rather than a local union official.
Indeed, in our experience, dissidents tend, if anything, to
receive better representation than the merits of their particular cases sometimes warrant. We hold this belief because the
union has a strong incentive to avoid the appearance of
retaliating against its political opposition
and to avoid
144
dissident.
a
to
exposure
legal
potential
In Hammontree, the Court accepted the Board's general
policy that deferral is inappropriate when the aggrieved
1 45
employee is at odds with the elected union leadership.
The Court, however, glossed over the claimed conflict between
the employee and the union leadership and refused to overturn the Board's deferral decision on the basis of those alleged

conflicts. 146
It was also argued in Hammontree that deferral was
inappropriate there because of the nonarbitral decisionmaking process of the Teamster Joint Committees. 41 Such
committees are normally composed of equal numbers 14of
representatives appointed by the union and the employer. 1
No impartial arbitrator is involved.1 49 Instead, the final
determination is the result of one side persuading the other to
concede on a particular case. The Supreme Court, however,
has refused to distinguish joint boards from arbitration on this

basis. 150
statements of position and documentary evidence. See id. art. VII, § 4(a)-(b), at 46-47.
The fourth stage, which can be invoked whenever the union remains dissatisfied with
management's answer in the third stage, is handled by the UAW's National Ford
Department in Detroit. At the fourth stage, the dispute can be submitted to an
impartial umpire for final and binding resolution in accordance with terms of the
contract. See id. Submission to the umpire involves presentation and crossexamination of witnesses, oral argument, and submission of briefs by both sides. See
id. art. VII, §§ 11, 13, at 52-53.
143.

See 1 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN UAW AND THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, supra

note 142, art. VII, § 4(d), at 48.
144. In Bowen v. U.S. Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212 (1983), the Court indicated
that the union retains almost all of the backpay liability after withdrawal of any
grievance, where that withdrawal is the result of unfair representation and the
grievance is meritorious. Id. at 228-30.
145. 925 F.2d at 1498-99.
146. See id. at 1498.
147. See id. at 1516-17 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
148.

See 1 AGREEMENTS BETWEEN UAW AND THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, supra

note 142, art. VII, § 4(d), at 48.
149. See Hammontree, 925 F.2d at 1516.
150. See General Drivers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., Inc., 372 U.S. 517,
519 (1963) (per curiam).
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Although this joint board approach lacks some of the
characteristics commonly associated with arbitration, there
are arguments that a joint board resolution should receive at
least the same degree of deference as a negotiated unionemployer resolution of a grievance. In essence, joint boards
function as a mechanism to achieve just such a negotiated
resolution. The Board has had difficulty deciding whether to
defer to such negotiated resolutions of disputes. 5 1 More
recently, however, the Board has announced that it will defer
to negotiated grievance resolutions under the same standards
applicable to arbitral awards under Olin.'5 2
It has also been argued that Teamster joint board resolutions are distinguishable from typical negotiated resolutions
of grievances. Public Citizen Litigation Group, for example,
argues that such joint boards are generally composed of
individuals with limited knowledge of the facts involved in
particular cases and that such boards generally resolve a
large number of grievances during each session, leading
Public Citizen Litigation Group to speculate that improper
"horsetrading" occurs."5 3 We express no opinion as to the
validity of these arguments.

151. See, e.g., Laredo Packing Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 1, 5 (1981) (affirming AJ's
decision not to defer to grievance settlement reached before arbitration stage);
Roadway Express, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 174, 175 (1979) (holding that deferral to private
settlement is not appropriate where it was unclear that the legality of the discharge
at issue was discussed and where the parties disagreed about the settlement terms
and application), supplemented in 250 N.L.R.B. 393 (1980), enforcement denied in
relevantpart,647 F.2d 415,424-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the Board's justifications
for nondeferral as without a factual basis and concluding that deferral was
warranted); Ford Motor Co. (Rouge Complex), 233 N.L.R.B. 698, 700 n.12 (1977)
(stating that deferral is not appropriate where grievances changed after the
settlement process. began and were not submitted to arbitration); Super Valu Xenia,
Div. of Super Valu Stores, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1254, 1260 (1977) (adopting the decision
by ALJ that deferral to the decision of a two-man Labor Management Council is
inappropriate where employees involved were not present, no testimony was taken,
no transcript was available, and union representatives did not know which cases were
to be discussed); Central Cart Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 337, 338 (1973) (deferral).
152. See Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547 (1985) (stating that arbitral
deferral principles apply equally to settlement "because they further the national
labor policy which favors private resolution of labor disputes"), petition for review
denied sub. nom. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1987); see also
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 281 N.L.R.B. 440, 442, (1986) (applyingAlpha Beta
rule).
153. See, e.g., Brief for Teamsters for a Democratic Union as Amicus Curiae,
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (No. 881719) (Sept. 18, 1989) (authored by attorneys from the Public Citizen Litigation
Group).
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Where a grievance-arbitration system ends in a hearing
before a neutral arbitrator, these issues do not arise and the
case for deferral to that process cannot be questioned on those
grounds. Virtually all UAW contracts of which we are aware
15 4
employ a system involving a neutral arbitrator or umpire.
Most other unions utilize such a system as well.'5 5
In closing, we would like to discuss the implications of
internal union review mechanisms for Board deferral policies.
Internal union review is an important part of the UAW's
grievance-handling structure. Although the decision whether
to pursue or withdraw a grievance at any particular stage in
the procedure is made by appropriate elected local union or
International Union officials, any member has the right to
challenge the union's disposition of her grievance pursuant to
procedures spelled out in the UAW's Constitution.'5 6 These
challenge procedures include consideration by the full membership of the challenger's local union which, by majority vote,
may order the grievance reinstated.'5 7 If unsuccessful there,
the challenger may demand that a committee of the International's Executive Board consider her case."5 5 Finally, the
challenging member may choose between two routes for final
internal review. The challenger may submit her appeal to the
UAW's Convention Appeals Committee, 5 9 a group of approximately twenty individuals chosen randomly from among the

154.
See, e.g., AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CHRYSLER CORPORATION AND UAW,
ENGINEERING, OFFICE, AND CLERICAL, § 23(a), at 23 (May 16, 1988) (appeal Board
with impartial chairman to make final decision in appealed cases); 1 AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN UAW AND THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, supra note 142, art. VII, § 8, at 50
(impartial umpire); CENTRAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN J.I. CASE COMPANY AND
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA CENTRAL AGREEMENT, and LOCAL AGREEMENT LOCAL
UNION NO. 1306, EAST MOLINE, ILLINOIS, art. III, § 3(A), at 9 (May 11, 1987)
(impartial arbitrator); PRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE MAIN LABOR CONTRACT
BETWEEN NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORP. AND THE INTERNATIONAL
UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF
AMERICA, art.

VII, § 3, at 37 (Nov. 23, 1987) (permanent arbitrator selected by mutual

agreement); AGREEMENT BETWEEN VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., WESTMORELAND
ASSEMBLY PLANT, AND INTERNATIONAL UNION UAW AND ITS LOCAL 2055, 9 31, at 12-

13 (March 10, 1986) (arbitrator selected by the parties) (all agreements are on file
with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
155. See 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 51:5-:7 (1989).
156.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST. art. 33, § 1 (1989) (on file with the

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
157. Id. art. 33, §§ 2(a), 3(a).
158. Id. art. 33, §§ 2(a), 3(d).
159. Id. art. 33, §§ 2(a), 3(e).
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delegates to the Union's triennial convention,16 or she may
submit it to the UAW's Public Review Board (PRB),'16 ' a
group of distinguished lay and clergy individuals with no
institutional ties to the
UAW. 162 All decisions of the PRB
1 63
are final and binding.
An appeal at any stage of this process can reverse the
decision of the local or International Union official. Moreover,
to allow this process to result in complete relief, the UAW has
negotiated "reinstatement of grievance" letters with virtually
all of the major employers with whom the UAW bargains.'6 4
Pursuant to these letters, the employer agrees to abide by the
decision of the various UAW appellate bodies and reinstate the
165
grievance where it was improperly settled or withdrawn.
160. Id. art. 33, § 3(f).
161. Id. art. 32; id. art. 33, §§ 2(a), 3(f).
162. Id. art. 32, § 1 (calling for the establishment of 'a Public Review Board
consisting of impartial persons of good public repute not working under the jurisdiction
of the UAW or employed by the International Union or any of its subordinate bodies").
The current members of the Public Review Board are: Msgr. George G. Higgins,
Chairman, who is the Director of the Division for Urban Life, Department of Social
Developments, U.S. Catholic Conference; Dr. Jean T. McKelvey, Professor, New York
State School of Industrial & Labor Relations; James E. Jones, Jr., Professor,
University of Wisconsin Law School; Theodore J. St. Antoine, Professor, University of
Michigan Law School; Benjamin Aaron, Professor of Law, University of California at
Los Angeles; and Paul C. Weiler, Professor, Harvard Law School. See PUBLIC REVIEW
BOARD, THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1990).

The membership of the PRB has included Wade McCree, former U.S. Solicitor
General; Robben Fleming, former President of the University of Michigan; Eleanor
Holmes Norton, member of Congress for the District of Columbia, former Professor,
Georgetown University Law School, and former Chair of the National Labor Relations
Board; and other individuals of stature and reputation. See id.; PUBLIC REVIEW
BOARD, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1960). No member of the PRB can be employed by
the UAW, or work under its jurisdiction. They must be independent of the UAW.
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT

WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST. art. 32, § 1 (1989). The PRB controls its own
budget, maintains its own office, and schedules its own docket. While the President
of the International Union, UAW, appoints new members to fill vacancies, he must do
so from a list submitted by the remaining members of the PRB, and his appointments
must be ratified by the next UAW Constitutional Convention. Id. art. 32, § 2.
163. Id. art. 32, § 3(a).
164. See, e.g., Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 691 n.18 (1981); Monroe v. International Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 25 (6th Cir. 1983); Spear v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 137
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2755, 2757 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affd without published op., 925 F.2d
1470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2894 (1991); Wiggins v. Chrysler Corp., 728
F. Supp. 463,466-67 (N.D. Ohio 1989), affd without published op., 905 F.2d 1539 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 582 (1990); Curry v. Ford Motor Co., 646 F. Supp. 261,
263 (W.D. Ky. 1983); Nesbitt v. International Harvester, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3446,
3447-48 (W.D. Tenn. 1982); Hedge v. Deere & Co., 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3401, 3402
(S.D. Ill. 1978).
165. See supra note 164. The text of the UAW/Ford letter is reprinted in part in
Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 670 F. Supp. 237, 238 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1987), af/d without op.,
852 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1988).

684

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL.

24:3 & 4

Because the result of these internal appeals can affect the
processing of grievances under the contract, these internal
procedures should be viewed as part of the contractual
grievance mechanism itself.166 NLRB review is that much
less necessary, and deferral that much more appropriate,
where these internal review mechanisms are thorough and
fair.
In cases involving a claim against a union for breaching its
duty of fair representation, the Board has held that deferral
is inappropriate because the "issue ...does not ... involve a
dispute between contracting parties over the interpretation of
a provision in the contract."16 7 In duty of fair representation
cases the NLRB suddenly understands the difference between
contract and statutory rights. But in these cases-no less
than in cases involving alleged employer reprisals in violation
of section 8(a)(3)-the contract and its interpretation may also
be at issue. Certainly the presence of internal review mechanisms capable of reversing a union's decision provides at least
the same degree of relief from allegedly improper union
conduct as arbitration procedures provide from improper
employer conduct. The case for NLRB deferral to internal
procedures designed to address and remedy fair representation
claims is therefore at least as strong as the case for deferral
to arbitration of contract disputes.
Deferring to internal union remedies is not only consistent
with the Board's Spielberg-Collyer rationale for deferring to
arbitration in contract-dispute cases, it is basic to the goal of
strong and democratic unions. Requiring members with fair
representation claims first to register their complaint with the
union itself, and then to exhaust the internal remedies
available to them, will improve the union's effectiveness and
self-government.1 6 8 Refusal to defer in this context also
166. Cf. Wagner v. General Dynamics, 905 F.2d 126, 127-28 (6th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (finding that an employee whose claim was reinstated by the UAW and
settled with the employer failed to exhaust remedies because he did not appeal the
settlement to the Public Review Board as provided in the UAW Constitution).
167. Western Conference of Teamsters, 251 N.L.R.B. 331, 338 n.1 (1980) (AMJ
opinion); cf NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S.
418, 428 (1968) (concluding that "a court or agency might consider whether a
particular [internal review] procedure was 'reasonable' and entertain the complaint
even though [the] procedure[] had not been 'exhausted'").
168. In fact, this self-government argument is arguably more compelling in the
case of internal union review mechanisms than in the case of contractual grievance
procedures. If the union is to be motivated to create-and take pride in the operation
of-internal review procedures, those procedures must be respected and unions must
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weakens the grievance process itself. Thus, if a union has
established a fair, efficient, effective, and accessible process for
hearing and remedying member complaints against the union,
the Board should stay its hand, at least until the union's
remedies have been exhausted.
Mandatory exhaustion of available internal union appeals
also supports the development of union democracy by encouraging unions to establish internal procedures to remedy
abuses by their officials, while simultaneously providing
reasonably expeditious relief to aggrieved employees. In fact,
courts have articulated this rationale in applying section
411(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959,169 which protects members' right to file suit
against a union in a court or before an administrative agency,
but provides that "any such member may be required to
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (... not to exceed a
four-month lapse of time)"17 ° established by the union before
doing so.17 1
In addition, the "ripeness" argument in support of NLRB
deferral doctrines applies with full force to internal union
appeal processes. Until a member has sought internal relief, a
union's action remains capable of reversal.17 2 Until a union's
action is truly final, no cause of action has accrued.1 73 In
Clayton v. International Union, UAW17 4 the Supreme Court
held that a hybrid fair-representation/breach-of-contract action

be allowed to use those procedures before facing Board charges. In contrast, employers do not implement arbitration procedures out of a unilateral desire to operate
honestly and democratically; instead, such procedures are established as the result
of bilateral negotiations with the union.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1988).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir.) (holding that
where an employee offered no reasons for failing to exhaust the internal grievance
procedure, dismissal for such failure to exhaust those remedies was not an abuse of
discretion), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 848 (1967). Courts may exercise discretion when
requiring exhaustion of remedies. See id.
172. See, e.g., Clayton v. International Union, UAW, 451 U.S. 679,691 n.18 (1981)
(finding that when a collective-bargaining agreement "allow[s] the reinstatement of
withdrawn grievances where a union tribunal reverses the union's initial decision"
the availability of that "relief . . . would presumably be adequate" to require
exhaustion of that "union tribunal").
173. Cf. Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that statute of limitations in a fair representation hearing does not begin to
accrue until after the labor-management grievance arbitration hearing at which the
employer was allegedly treated unfairly has been completed).
174. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
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would be entertained prior to internal union review of the
More important than the particular
union's contract. 175
result, however, is the fact that the Court determined that
exhaustion of internal union review procedures could be
required so long as the procedures are fair, prompt, result in
review by an unbiased decision maker, and are capable of
providing the employee with complete relief.176 Following
Clayton, courts have routinely required exhaustion of such
internal union remedies before confronting such a hybrid
claim, as long as the internal union appeal procedures can
result in either complete relief or reinstatement of the
grievance. 177 This requirement is particularly appropriate
where the union's remedial procedures culminate in review by
a non-biased body such as the UAW's Constitutional Convention Appeals Committee and Public Review Board. 7 8
Although the NLRB defers to grievance procedures before
addressing unfair labor practice charges against employers, 179 and the courts defer to both grievance procedures 8 °
and internal union appeal mechanisms 8 ' before addressing
hybrid suits or suits against unions under Landrum-Griffin,
the Board completely refuses to defer to such internal union
review or appeal mechanisms before addressing a "straight"

175. Id. at 693.
176. See id. at 689. Generally, complete relief means reinstatement of the
grievance at the point in the grievance procedure where it was withdrawn or
compromised. See, e.g., id. at 692.
177. See, e.g., Wagner v. General Dynamics, 905 F.2d 126, 127-28 (6th Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) (involving an appeal to a public review board that could result in
reinstatement); Miller v. General Motors Corp., 675 F.2d 146, 148-49 (7th Cir. 1982)
(same).
178. See, e.g., Wagner, 905 F.2d at 128 (noting that the Public Review Board is
'an independent group of... persons with no UAW affiliation [and that] [t]here is
no indication whatever that [they] would operate with any bias . . . .'" (quoting

Monroe v. International Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983))); Battle v.
Clark Equip. Co., 579 F.2d 1338, 1343 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting that the adequacy
of UAW intraunion appeal procedures is judicially recognized).
179. See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 576 (1984) (establishing postarbitral
standards for deferral consistent with a "commitment to a policy of full, consistent
and even handed deference" to grievance procedures); United Technologies Corp., 268
N.L.R.B. 557, 560 (1984) (establishing standards favoring prearbitral deferral in
NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) cases).
180. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965)
(holding that use of contract grievance procedures must be attempted before direct
legal redress is sought).
181. See, e.g., Monroe v. International Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24 (6th Cir.
1983) (requiring exhaustion of union appeals procedures to maintain a duty of fair
representation claim unless such procedures are futile).
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duty of fair representation charge. 8 2 In our view, the NLRB
has yet to articulate a sound policy justification for this
position. In our view, it just doesn't make sense that failure
to exhaust internal remedies results in dismissal if the cause
of action is filed in court but has no impact if the employee
pursues the same matter through the NLRB.
Deferring "straight" duty of fair representation charges to
internal union appeal mechanisms would, in summary,
strengthen the grievance-arbitration machinery and the
union's internal review mechanisms, would enable unions to
direct more attention and resources toward advancing
workers' collective interests vis-et-vis employers, and would
encourage further democratization of unions' structures and
processes.8 3 For these reasons, deferral of "straight" duty
of fair representation claims to internal union review mechanisms is arguably more appropriate than deferral of section 8(a)(3) charges to contractual grievance and arbitration
machinery.

IV. CONCLUSION

As we have attempted to show, the NLRB has developed its
deferral doctrine in response to general labor policy concerns,
rather than a more sophisticated analysis of the nature of the
statutory rights at issue. This analytical flaw, in our view,
has led the Board to develop an improperly broad deferral
policy which denies employees a significant portion of the
statutory protections fashioned by Congress. Moreover, we
have attempted to show that the Board has developed an
indefensible double standard by applying its current analysis
to shield employers from agency scrutiny when private
processes are available, but refusing to show the same respect
for the processes that are found in the constitutions of many
unions.
182. See, e.g., Western Conference ofTeamsters, 251 N.L.R.B. 331,338 n.31 (1980)
(ALJ opinion) (finding deferral inappropriate because no contract dispute was
involved); Teamsters Local Union 519, 275 N.L.R.B. 433, 440 (1985) ("'The board has
not adopted a policy of deferral for exhaustion of internal disputes resolution
procedures between labor organizations and their members.'" (quoting Musicians
Local 47 (American Broadcasting), 255 N.L.R.B. 386, 391 (1981))).
183. Cf. Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (1967) (noting that the
purpose of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act proviso that
employees may be required to exhaust internal review mechanisms, 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a) (1988), "is to further development of union democracy").

